introduction

  On the battlefield of Russia and Ukraine, the competition for drone technology between the two sides is in full swing, constantly reshaping the picture of modern warfare. Three years ago, Ukrainian soldiers took the lead in putting commercial drones into the battlefield and gaining tactical initiatives with the help of civil volunteers. This emergency deployment unexpectedly gave birth to the first drone war in the history of war. As start-ups, venture capital and governments gradually enter the drone industry, "drone" has become a link to link the interests of these participants and accelerate the construction of a self-circulating drone ecosystem in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This technological ecosystem formed in the war has a speed of iteration far exceeding that of the conventional military-industrial system. Ukraine continues to innovate the drone ecosystem with a national participation model, providing a reference for asymmetric combat.

　　Development stage

  After the tempering of the war, Ukrainian drone industry has embarked on a unique path of development: from spontaneous technical research by private volunteers to the construction of the government-driven ecosystem, and finally upgraded to a national-level strategic industry. Three key nodes (the dispute in eastern Ukraine was born in 2014, the war in 2022 forced industrial transformation, and the outbreak of production capacity in 2024 increased supply and demand contradictions) continued to inject development resilience into the drone innovation ecosystem, not only forging a unique wartime drone research and development, production and equipment model, but also laid the foundation for post-war reconstruction.

  (I) Start-up period (2014-2022) Ukrainian drone industry began during the 2014 territorial dispute in the eastern region. At that time, the civilian technical team began to independently develop military drones in order to improve the calibration accuracy of artillery and improve the reconnaissance and intelligence system. Early products entered the military through three channels: direct government procurement, private fundraising and procurement, and export foreign exchange. Among them, government procurement methods have established a military-civilian technology docking mechanism, allowing manufacturers to iterate their products quickly according to battlefield conditions. This virtuous cycle has attracted some start-ups to enter. However, due to problems such as capital turnover and product quality, more than 50 drone companies established between 2014 and 2015 have achieved continuous operations by the end of 2020.

  At the same time, the Ukrainian armed forces have started a modern transformation and systematically introduced combat equipment from NATO countries. For example, the Turkish TB-2 investigation and strike integrated drone that began to be purchased in 2019 is a specific portrayal of this process. Sure enough, in the early stages of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, TB-2 showed significant tactical advantages, which not only caused a lot of losses to the Russian army, but also made it famous in the international military trade market.

  (II) Growth period (2022~2023) The Russian-Ukrainian conflict broke out in February 2022. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense still focused on the procurement of conventional weapons and did not include drone projects on the priority procurement list. At this time, the large number of drones needed by the army were mainly provided by charitable foundations and volunteer organizations such as "Come Back Alive". In addition to introducing foreign products, most of the local manufacturers are startups established since 2014, including domestic manufacturers such as DeViro, UkrSpecSystems and Athlon Avia (Table 1). Faced with the absence of government functions, well-known civil society groups have criticized senior military leaders for ignoring the tactical value of drones while launching a national drone donation campaign. As the war advances, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense gradually recognizes the reality: in the face of the scale, equipment and economic advantages of the Russian army, the Ukrainian army itself must build an asymmetric combat system. At the same time, the creative modification of commercial rotorcraft by the civilian technical team and the flexible tactics of the frontline troops made the balance of this drone showdown lean towards the Ukrainian army most of the time.

  In March 2023, the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation issued Law No. 256, reconstructing the drone industry ecosystem by simplifying equipment certification and procurement processes. With the joint efforts of the government and the military, drone production capacity has increased exponentially, greatly alleviating the urgent need for the shortage of drones in front-line troops. As of the end of 2023, the annual production capacity has reached nearly 300,000, and drones have achieved a fundamental transformation from battlefield emergency platforms to strategic weapons.

  (III) Expansion period (2024~current)

  As the conflict continues to escalate, Ukrainian armed forces have developed into the world's most representative drone user entity. The 2024 National Defense Industry Report of the Kiev Economic Research Institute shows that the Ukrainian Army's current average daily consumption of various types of drones exceeded 3,000, accounting for about 80% of the total domestic supply.

  In December 2023, Ukrainian senior management announced the launch of the "UAV Million Plan", which clearly required the three strategic goals to be achieved by 2024: mass production of 1 million FPV drones, 10,000 medium-range attack drones and 1,000 long-range attack drones systems. But what is surprising is that as of the end of 2024, the actual production capacity data released by Ukraine has exceeded 4 million aircraft. The structural contradictions are hidden behind this extraordinary development. The annual industrial survey of the Ukrainian Defense Technology Enterprise Association revealed that among the more than 200 suppliers participating in the survey, 55% of the actual capacity utilization rate of the enterprises is less than 30% of the design standards, resulting in the survival difficulties of manufacturers.

  The more severe challenge also comes from the insufficient funds for national defense procurement. According to the revised defense budget for fiscal year 2024, the actual contracted procurement volume of the Ukrainian military was only 1.5 million aircraft, less than 40% of the actual production capacity. To break through the current structural dilemma, the government urgently needs to solve the problem through means such as "optimizing capacity allocation internally and lifting the military export ban externally".

　　All interests of the ecosystem

  Since the three-year Russian-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine has used drones as its core combat force, both offense and defense, and has formed a full-chain technical capability in key links such as equipment research and development, mass production, actual combat deployment and iterative upgrades, promoting the drone industry to become a pillar of national security strategy. At present, Ukraine has built a drone innovation ecosystem including five types of entities including volunteer groups, start-ups, venture capital, government departments (including end-user military) and scientific research institutes (this article specifically refers to training schools). These stakeholders have experienced difficult running-in and adaptive adjustments in the war, and have established a collaborative mechanism covering demand docking, technology transformation, financial support and battlefield verification, driving the effective operation of the ecosystem.

  (I) Volunteer Group After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a special force quickly emerged among the Ukrainian people - a volunteer network composed of engineers, programmers, students and ordinary citizens. They support front-line troops in the rear, either in factories, basements, or in garages, through the Internet, based on open source technology, multinational collaboration and crowdfunding innovation. It is the large number of volunteer teams that have become the main driving force for turning commercial drones into powerful weapons on the battlefield of Russia and Ukraine.

  For example, in a project, software engineers shared code through the GitHub platform to convert the commercial four-axis rotor series drones that were common at that time into an aerial platform that can throw small bombs. More than 200 developers around the world participated in this open source project, engineers from Poland contributed 3D printed bomb bay design drawings, and the Lithuanian team developed anti-jamming communication modules. This cross-border collaboration model allows front-line troops to obtain the upgraded version of the best technology of the existing platform, and it is cheap. For example, the AI ​​recognition system developed by programmers can allow a drone to distinguish camouflaged vehicles and civilian trucks within 15 seconds, increasing the accuracy of target strikes for combat troops. In addition, there are agricultural drones equipped with thermal imagers and transformed into night sentries, providing protection from the top of the head for front-line soldiers.

  There are countless specific ways for volunteers to behave. All of this shows that the Ukrainian battlefield is witnessing an unprecedented movement of technological independence. Volunteers used online shopping Raspberry Pi motherboards and smartphone chips to assemble FPV suicide drones, which cost only $800, but successfully destroyed the multi-million-dollar T-90 tank. This asymmetric innovative war example not only subverts the cognitive model of traditional wars, but also shows that modern wars cannot be separated from the support of civil forces. In other words, in the Internet era, products that every ordinary person participates in may become "digital" bullets shot at opponents.

  (II) Before the start-up conflict between Russia and Ukraine, few private enterprises were involved in Ukraine's national defense field, and there was no large-scale drone industry. After Ukraine's independence in 1991, based on the global trend of "military-civilian integration", Ukraine began to reorganize Soviet heritage and formed a large state-owned military-industry group Ukroboronprom. Although some of the subsidiaries within the group tried the waters for drone research and development after 2014, substantial industrial breakthroughs began when the Russian-Ukrainian War broke out in 2022. The escalation of the war has triggered a large number of start-ups to flock to the drone track, including many multinational technical cooperation projects. After market screening, the current Ukrainian drone industry has formed an ecosystem with more than 200 companies as the core, and the production capacity and products show significant differentiation: FPV drones have an absolute output advantage, and about 70% of companies regard this as their flagship product.

  Start-ups are based on scientific and technological innovation and focus on the battlefields of Russia and Ukraine, and simultaneously promote the research and development of unmanned equipment in the air, sea and ground (Table 2). Their technological iteration speed has become the main factor in "forming battlefield advantages." The established industry associations deeply participate in national-level industrial coordination, play a central role in policy consultation, technical research and international cooperation, and form an innovation mechanism for government-enterprise collaboration with the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Strategic Industry and the Ministry of Digital Transformation.

  Aerial UAV: ​​The research and development of aerial UAVs is inseparable from the feedback from end users. The military plays an active traction role in all stages of technical requirements, prototype design, production and manufacturing, testing and service. In order to fight against the Russian army's electromagnetic suppression, we have innovatively adopted technologies such as frequency hopping counter and computer vision-assisted recognition, and an arms race for fiber-guided drones will be launched in 2024. At the end of the same year, the Ukrainian army announced the installation of "rocket engines" to realize the technological integration of drones and ballistic weapons.

  Sea-surface UAV: ​​The research and development and equipment of sea-surface UAVs is another asymmetric combat strategy for the Uzbekistan to deal with the threat of the Russian army. Although sea drones are classified weapons of the Ukrainian army, we can still observe their impact on the course of the war. For example: Sea Baby successfully damaged several Russian frigates; another prominent phenomenon is that the number of ships deployed by the Russian Navy in the Black Sea has been greatly reduced since 2022. The current equipment models cover recyclable attack type, suicide assault type and ISR mission type. Some sea drones that are still under test can be equipped with air defense and electronic warfare and other equipment to achieve multi-purpose combat.

  Land drone: As early as 2016, the Ukrainian Army began to explore the concept of ground unmanned platforms. At present, the development of land drone platforms has become a priority for Wujun in 2025. Compared with aerial drones, land drone technology faces the following challenges: it must operate in rugged ground environments, adapt to various weather conditions, and complete tasks at medium and short distances. Ukrainian startups have developed more than 200 different types of land drone platforms, and developers are working to improve key technologies such as range, working hours and connection protection, thereby achieving more advanced features such as target identification and attack automation.

  (III) The funding needs of venture capital start-ups are particularly urgent in the initial stage. Under normal scale, founders often start their own funds and financing for relatives and friends, and rely on product sales to accumulate subsequent development capital. The financing paths of Ukrainian drone startups have shown significant differences due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine: their early large amounts of funds are mainly realized by defense purchase orders (Table 3), that is, product delivery is exchanged for advance payments.

  In addition to the above procurement funds, start-ups have also received strategic investments focusing on technological innovation (Table 4). The government-led funding system constitutes the core support: As a flagship project jointly built by the Ministry of Digital Transformation and multi-departmental departments, the Brave1 platform has established a cross-departmental collaboration network by integrating policies, capital and information resources in the field of defense science and technology. Its goal is to Ukraine's leadership position in the global defense technology market. At the same time, the "Innovation Development Fund" affiliated to the same department focuses on building a scientific and technological innovation ecosystem and using institutional design to accelerate the process of technological industrialization. The "Quick Leading to Victory" sub-project under the fund is particularly typical. By simplifying the technical certification process of the Ministry of Defense, the qualification acquisition cycle for drone products under development is greatly shortened.

  (IV) The Ukrainian government only played a substantial leadership role in the field of drones nearly a year after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Previously, the government had a long-term insufficient investment in drones, which caused widespread criticism from people with knowledge. The drone equipment urgently needed on the battlefield throughout 2022 depends mainly on private volunteer organizations and charitable foundations to raise. At this stage, the government not only underestimated the effectiveness of drones, but also mistakenly regarded conventional weapons as key platforms to resist opponents. Things turned around at the end of 2022. The government began to gradually establish a support system for the drone industry through management system reform, resource allocation mechanism optimization and procurement system reconstruction:

  1. Issue a new legal system. In March 2023, the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Ministry of Strategic Industry jointly issued Decree No. 256, which mainly activates the drone market through three types of reform measures: simplifying the procurement approval process, relaxing the technical access standards, and increasing the profit margin limit to 25% (if the amount exceeds the amount, special approval is required). The loosening of regulation has significantly stimulated market vitality, and by the end of 2023, the number of drone manufacturers exceeded 200. In September 2024, the issuance of Act No. 763 further broke through industry restrictions and allowed ammunition manufacturers who have not completed qualification certification to implement emergency delivery. It is worth noting that the government has also strengthened industrial protection simultaneously and stipulated that domestic drone exports are banned from January 2025. The current overcapacity has formed a major obstacle to the development of the industry.

  2. Coordinated allocation of industrial resources

  A large number of startups have poured into the drone industry in a short period of time, which will inevitably bring about overlap in the direction and functions of drone products, and waste various resources that are already insufficient. In response to this situation, the government intends to build a coordination mechanism through the following means: the Innovation and Defense Technology Center of the Ministry of Defense systematically coordinates the development of innovation technology of drones through project management; the National Defense Procurement Bureau has established a demand response mechanism to guide procurement direction based on real-time feedback information on the battlefield; the Brave1 project builds a fund allocation platform to coordinate the collaborative relationship between start-ups, government agencies and venture capital. In addition, the government has simultaneously promoted the deepening of international cooperation, and the DFNC annual forum founded in 2023 has become an important platform for multinational technology collaboration.

  3. Innovation Strategy for Enterprise Guarantee Mechanism. Ministry of Industry implements the "Talent Retention Plan": Startups that have received Brave1 project funding or government contracts, their core employees can be exempted from war mobilization and recruitment. This move ensures that key positions and personnel of the company can continue to contribute their talents to the national defense cause. The subsidy financing plan launched in November 2024 is more breakthrough, allowing defense companies to obtain 3-5-year low-interest loans, and the difference between the benchmark interest rate and the market interest rate is subsidized by the state's finance. These two policies build industrial protection from the two aspects of human capital and capital supply.

  4. The UAV Force was established in September 2024 to cooperate with the in-depth reform of the UAV industry. This move improved the military procurement process, incorporated drones into combat regulations, and clarified drones' combat technical indicators and requirements in order to help drones gain combat advantages in the air, sea and land fields. At the same time, in the process of drone development, in addition to providing a site for performance testing, the drone force also quickly feedbacks the test conclusions. Therefore, the manufacturer sends the drone to the test site, receives feedback from testers, updates technical capabilities, and provides a new prototype again, etc. The time required for the entire process is calculated in days. If there is no deep military intervention, the R&D time may usually take several weeks.

  5. Expand the scope of procurement model. Since the implementation of Act No. 256, the scale of local drone procurement has expanded rapidly. Against this background, start-ups and the military have accelerated cooperation in testing drones. The military assists enterprises in preparing documents and applying for certification qualifications from the Ministry of Defense. This close cooperative relationship ensures rapid product iteration in a systematic manner. In addition to the Ukrainian National Special Communications Service and the National Defense Procurement Bureau as government procurement representatives, local governments are also authorized to use local fiscal budgets to purchase drones. The establishment of the UAV unit also prompted the Ministry of Defense to approve that the UAE can purchase drones directly from manufacturers with brigade-level combat units.

  (V) Compared with the top four stakeholders, the role of education and research institutions in the Ukrainian drone innovation ecosystem is still weak, and their contributions are mainly concentrated in the fields of professional course development, basic research and practical training. However, the innovative breakthroughs and military applications of cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence and cluster combat in the field of drones have not yet formed significant scientific research output.

  Despite this, we can still see the efforts of educational and training institutions. Although the sudden outbreak of war has led to a surge in demand for drones, the shortage of qualified pilots is even more prominent. To this end, the Russian-Ukrainian war quickly gave birth to a professional training system, which improved the ability of volunteers and military personnel to operate drones through high-intensity and quick courses. This system breaks through the traditional education framework and forms the following three types of special training:

  Practical training system: The FPV special training course offered by KillHouse Academy focuses on multi-environmental control skills; ProFPV UA Drone School strengthens high-voltage environmental operating capabilities by integrating engineering principles and tactical theories; military certification agencies such as Boryviter and Kruk directly issue drone pilot qualification certificates to build a professional army talent delivery channel.

  Engineering support training: In order to support the drone production campaign involving the whole people in 2022, technical support courses have been rapidly popularized. Online platforms such as People's FPV teach FPV control technology; Dronarnia specializes in the research, development and mass production of tactical-grade drones. In addition to these online teaching, UA Drone School holds a four-day training course offline, designed for military personnel to quickly master operational skills, with short courses and knowledge-intensive courses.

  Specialized training for aircraft models: The mechanism represented by Boryviter is equipped with special training modules for multi-rotor, fixed wing and FPV multi-axis rotor aircraft, and the composite technical backbone is cultivated through practical operation of full-spectrum models.

  It should be pointed out that the current educational innovation only focuses on the field of aerial drones, and the training system and academic research on unmanned equipment on sea and ground are still in a blank state.

　　Conclusion

  The technological revolution spawned by this crisis is essentially a contest of "asymmetric innovation". When volunteer teams fill the technology gap as civilians, start-ups achieve rapid product iteration, optimize resource allocation of venture capital, and open up institutional barriers, while training institutions continue to provide battlefield applications in practical fields - the innovation ecological environment of the drone industry intertwined by these five stakeholders constitutes the core reason for the rapid rise of Ukrainian drone industry. The science and technology competition in modern warfare has evolved from a simple equipment competition to an overall competition of the national innovation ecosystem. (Wang Liqun)

[Editor in charge: Wang Jinzhi]